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During its one hundred seventy-two years history the United
States has been without the services of its chief executive because
of illness for a total of at least a year.' The dangers of lapse of
executive power have been discussed in numerous articles, and at
*Unless otherwise indicated the recipient of letters referred to in the foot-
notes was the Editor-in-Chief of this Review. The letters, which were in
reply to a general survey, are presently on file and available through the
office of the Editor-in-Chief.
tB.S., 1953, LL.B., 1956, University of Nebraska; Member, Lincoln, Ne-
braska, and American Bar Associations; American Association of Law
Librarians. Assistant Librarian, University of Nebraska College of Law.
Gratitude is hereby expressed to Law Review Staff Members Charles M.
Pallesen, Jr., and Richard A. Peterson, Class of '62, for their work as re-
search assistants. Their attention to detail, application and interest con-
tributed immeasurably to the scope of the article; without their help the
author could not have completed the task outside of office hours.
I Disability, for purposes of this article, means absence from regular duties.
By this criterion, the following estimate is conservative: President Tay-
lor-Bedridden for five days until his death; President Harrison-
Bedridden for seven days until his death; President Garfield-Bedridden
for eighty days from the time he was shot until his death; President Mc-
Kinley-Bedridden eight days from the time he was shot until his death;
President Wilson-Bedridden and convalescing for two hundred and
eighty days from the time of his stroke until he resumed cabinet meet-
ings; President Harding--Semi-invalid for four days from the time of his
first attack until his death; President Eisenhower-One hundred and
forty-three days from his heart attack until his announced recovery.
These figures do not take note of the fact that President Wilson never
fully recovered, nor do they reflect President Eisenhower's absenteeism
for ileitis, his minor stroke or Cleveland's absence from the White House
for an operation for cancer of the jaw. Also excluded are the nine hours
and twenty-two minutes Lincoln was unconscious before his death and
the two hours and fifteen minutes Franklin Roosevelt was comatose
before his death. No attempt was made to determine the number of days
away from work because of colds, sinus infections, gall bladder or intesti-
nal disorders, and other illnesses of this type. Practically speaking, the
figures on Presidential absenteeism would encompass three to four
years of our history if figured cumulatively. See, e.g., MARX, THE
HEALTH OF THE PRESIDENTS (1960); WOLD, MR. PRESIDENT,
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least one book.2  Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell
has said: 3
The realization has grown among the thoughtful people that
our very survival in this age may rest on the capacity of the
nation's chief executive to make swift and unquestioned decisions
in an emergency. As a result, a major constitutional problem,
previously glossed over, has been brought to the fore. The problem
is that posed by temporary presidential inability to discharge the
powers and duties of the presidency at a time when emergency
action is required.
As Mr. Brownell points out, the problem of presidential disability
4
has been "glossed over," but it has been recognized.. President
Eisenhower and Attorney General Brownell made a serious effort
to fill the void which now exists in our law.5
Gubernatorial disability has been largely ignored, despite the
fact that many governors have been incapacitated. Governor
Horner of Illinois was ill and bedridden most of the time between
November 8, 1938, and October 6, 1939.6 In 1959 Governor Earl
Long of Louisiana was disabled. The unfortunate series of events
which occurred there are without parallel in American state gov-
HOW IS YOUR HEALTH .(1948); DALE, MEDICAL BIOGRAPHIES
(1952).
2 The best articles are: Davis, Inability of the President, S. Doc. No. 308,
65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918); Silva, Presidential Succession and Disability,
21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 646 (1956); Brownell, Presidential Dis-
ability: The Need For a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L. J. 189
(1958). Silva is the author of the only book solely devoted to the topic:
SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION, University of Michigan Press,
Ann Arbor, (1951), Copyright by the University of Michigan. For other
articles on the subject see: Symposium-Presidential Inability, 133
NO. AM. REV. 417 (1881); Curtis, Presidential Inability, 25 HARPER'S
WEEKLY 583 (1881); Fulton, Presidential Inability, 24 ALBANY L. J.
286 (1881); Rogers, American Government & Politics, 14 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 74 (1920); Lavery, Presidential Inability, 8 A.B.A.J. 13 (1922);
Heinlein, The Problem of Presidential Inability, 25 U. OF CINC. L. REV.
310 (1956); Note, 24 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 448 (1956); 32 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 357 (1958).
:3 Supra note 2, at 212.
4 The word used is "disability," rather than "inability." This is for two
reasons: 1) The use of both words in the Constitution (Art. II, § 1 cl. 6)
has compounded the problem; 2) "inability" connotes to some a lack of
intellectual as well as physical or mental capacity.
5 S. Res. 161, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958). Sponsors included Senators
Kefauver, Dirksen, Hruska, Hennings, Johnston of South Carolina,
Langer, Watson, Jenner and Butler.
6 Note, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 521 (1941),
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ernment. It was also in 1959 that Nebraska's Governor Ralph G.
Brooks suffered a stroke, the first of a series of illnesses leading to
his death in office on September 9, 1960.8
This article is an effort to explore some areas of constitutional
law and legal history, as well as political thought, which have not
previously been thoroughly examined. In the field of gubernatorial
disability the aim is to present for the first time a definitive exam-
ination of the myriad problems involved. The concluding section
will offer suggestions for dealing with the entire problem of execu-
tive disability.
II. INTER-RELATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL
DISABILITY CLAUSES
What is the status of an alternate9 who exercises temporarily
the powers of the executive? As a practical matter it makes no
7WORLD ALMANAC 107 (1960), impartially describes the situation:
"After a week in which Louisiana Gov. Earl K. Long (D.) had burst
into profanity on two occasions in the State Legislature, he was flown
from Baton Rouge to Galveston, Tex., May 30 for mental observation in
John Sealy Hospital. After medical testimony that Long was mentally
ill and likely to injure himself or others, Probate Judge Hugh Gibson
of Galveston, at the request of the Governor's wife, Blanche, ordered
him held in protective custody at the hospital June 2 pending a court
hearing. Long charged in a court petition in Galveston June 12 that
he had been drugged in Louisiana, bound and taken to Galveston by
force. He was released from John Healy Hospital June 17 and flown
to New Orleans on his promise to enter Ochsner Foundation Hospital
there, which he did. Long stormed out of the hospital June 18 and
headed for Baton Rouge in a car but was intercepted at the Louisiana
line.by State Police armed with a court order requested by his wife;
he was committed to Southeast Louisiana State Hospital in Mandeville.
In a move that prevented his wife from opposing his discharge from the
hospital, Long filed suit June 25 for a legal separation. Prior to a
court hearing at Covington, La., June 26, Long discharged the director
of state hospitals and the superintendent of the Mandeville institution
and named two new officials, who declared him sane and a free man.
The court then dismissed the proceedings."
S Lincoln Star, Sept. 10, 1960, p. 1, col. 1. Brooks' prolonged absence
from office provoked many comments, not unsympathetic, but concerned
over the operation of state government. The Lincoln Evening Journal,
April 28, 1960, p. 4, col. 1, remarked in an editorial: "The brief record
of the 62-year old governor also has been plagued by serious illness.
In his 17 months of office he has been hospitalized 47 days and off the
job for health reasons for a total of about 3 months." Governor Brooks
was hospitalized again on Aug. 24, 1960, for treatment of a virus infec-
tion, but this time he did not recover.
9 "Alternate" will be used to designate the second in command-the
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difference if the executive dies; but the precedent established at
the time of the first death in office of an American President has
since been applied to cases of temporary disability. A problem has
arisen from the assumption by John Tyler in 1841 that the Vice
President becomes President when he assumes the powers and
duties of the office. The tradition thus established has created
the fear that if an alternate assumes office during a temporary dis-
ability, the President is barred from resuming the functions of
the office upon recovery. Another historic question has been: Who
determines disability? The legislative intent of the delegates to
the federal Constitutional Convention becomes all important at
this point.
The degree to which the national disability clause is based on
similar clauses in colonial charters and state constitutions has
never been thoroughly considered. 10 Scholars have confined them-
selves to the proceedings of the federal Convention.1
Alexander Hamilton alludes to state disability provisions in
the Federalist. 12 After discussing the reasons for electing a vice
president and making him presiding officer of the Senate, Hamilton
says: 13
The other consideration is, that as the Vice President may
occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme
executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode
of election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with
equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable
that in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is
lieutenant governor or vice president, as the case may be. "Chief execu-
tive" refers to the governor or president.
10 The notable exception is WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF THE VICE PRESI-
DENCY 16 (1956), where colonial experience is considered with reference
to secondary sources.
11 Herbert Brownell does not once mention THE FEDERALIST in his
otherwise excellent article.
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 427 (Lodge ed., 1888) (Hamilton). Ham-
ilton's concept of the disability clause harmonizes with his characteriza-
tion of the executive generally: "Energy in the executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government." THE FEDERALIST NO.
70 (Hamilton).
13 The provision of the New York Constitution referred to by Hamilton
reads as follows: "And in the case of the impeachment of the governor,
or his removal from office, death, resignation, or absence from the State,
the lieutenant governor shall exercise all the power and authority ap-
pertaining to the office of the governor until another be chosen, or
the governor absent or impeached shall return or be acquitted. . ....
5 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC
LAWS 2633 (1909). (Emphasis added).
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made would lie against the constitution of this state [New York].
We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large,
who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute
for the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would
authorize the Vice-President to exercise the authorities and dis-
charge the duties of the President.
David Beetle characterized the New York lieutenant governor as
"a sort of stand-in for the colonial governor.' 4
Colonial history has a multitude of examples of a "deputie
governour" temporarily performing the governor's duties. The
conditions of Eighteenth Century America were foremost in the
minds of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. They
were well aware of the provisions established many years earlier
to prevent a void in executive power. The practice of the colonial-
ists in this respect was virtually the same from the first instance
at Jamestown in 1617 until the adoption of the Constitution.
15
In 1689 it was necessary for William Penn, then governor of
Pennsylvania, to report to the King on the status of the colony.
He wrote to the Assembly: 16
And if you Desire a Deputy Governor rather, name three, or
five, and I shall name one of them, so as you Consider of a Com-
fortable substance, that ye Government may not go a begging.
Seventeen of the colonial charters and constitutions in effect at
various times before the adoption of the federal constitution pro-
vide for a lieutenant governor or his equivalent.1 7 Fifteen of
14 BEETLE, THE NEW YORK CITIZEN 107 (1955).
15 Supra note 10, at 16; CHITWOOD, A HISTORY OF COLONIAL AMER-
ICA 74, 77 (1948).
16PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, GOVERNOR'S PAPERS 1681-1747, 103
(1900).
17 The charters were usually granted to a person or persons and their
"heires, deputyes, agents, commissioners and assigns." So executive power
in early America transferred automatically by descent. As democracy
grew, the lieutenant governor emerged as a "deputie" rather than an
"heire." Pertinent sections of the charters and constitutions of the
thirteen colonies and the states of the confederation appear in THORPE,
AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS
(1909). (Hereinafter cited by volume and page number).
Connecticut: COUNCIL FOR NEW ENGLAND (1620) (1 THORPE
1831); COMMISSION TO ANDROS (1688) (1 THORPE 1869); GOVERN-
MENT OF NEW HAVEN COLONY (1643) (I THORPE 528); CHARTER
OF CONNECTICUT (1662) (I THORPE 531).
Delaware: DUTCH WEST INDIA COMPANY'S PATENT (1621) (1
THORPE 60); GRANT TO WILLIAM PENN (1681) (1 THORPE 3045);
FRAMES OF GOVERNMENT (1682) (1 THORPE 3055); DEL. CONST.
(1776) (1 THORPE 563).
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these gave him status as "acting governor. '18 Of these fifteen, four
provide for these powers to be exercised during the absence of the
governor, 9 and ten for the inability or "sickness" of the governor. 21,
Colonial precedent is clear. Only the Constitutions of South
Carolina of 1776 and 1777 state that the lieutenant governor suc-
ceeds to the office of governor.2 1 The clauses did not specifically
Georgia: PROPRIETARY PROPOSALS (1663) (2 THORPE 2754);
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS, CAROLINA (1669) (2 THORPE
2772, 2779); GA. CONST. (1777) (2 THORPE 777).
Maryland: MD. CONST. (1776) (3 THORPE 1686).
Massachusetts: CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629) (3
THORPE 1852); CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1691) (3
THORPE 1877, 1884) MASS. CONST. (1780) (3 THORPE 1888).
New Hampshire: N.H. CONST. (1776) (4 THORPE 2451); N.H. CONST.
(1784) (4 THORPE 2453).
New Jersey: N.J. CONST. (1776) (5 THORPE 2596).
New York: N.Y. CONST. (1777) (5 THORPE 2633).
North Carolina: N.C. CONST. (1776) (5 THORPE 2792).
Pennsylvania: PA. CONST. (1776) (5 THORPE 3087).
Rhode Island: CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS (1663) (6 THORPE 3214).
South Carolina: S.C. CONST. (1776) (6 THORPE 3245); S.C. CONST.
(1778) (6 THORPE 3249).
Virginia: VA. CONST. (1776) (7 THORPE 3817).
is Citations to THORPE, op. cit. supra note 17.
Connecticut: COMMISSION TO ANDROS (1688); GOVERNMENT OF
NEW HAVEN COLONY (1643).
Delaware: DEL. CONST. (1776).
Georgia: FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS, CAROLINA (1669);
GA. CONST. (1776).
Maryland: MD. CONST. (1776).
Massachusetts: CHARTERS OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY (1629)
(1691); MASS. CONST. (1780).
New Hampshire: N.H. CONST. (1784).
New Jersey: N.J. CONST. (1776).
New York: N.Y. CONST. (1777).
North Carolina: N.C. CONST. (1776).
Pennsylvania: PA. CONST. (1776).
Virginia: VA. CONST. (1776).
It should be noted that ten of these documents were adopted within
the twenty years immediately before the federal convention and thus
fairly indicate contemporary thought and practice.
19 Citations to THORPE, op. cit. supra note 17. GOVERNMENT OF NEW
HAVEN COLONY (1643); N.J. CONST. (1776); N.Y. CONST. (1777);
PA. CONST. (1776).
20 Citations to THORPE, op. cit. supra note 17. CHARTER OF MASSA-
CHUSETTS BAY (1629); CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT (1662); MASS.
CONST. (1789); GA. CONST. (1776); N.H. CONST. (1784); N.C.
CONST. (1776); R.I. CONST. (1663); VA. CONST. (1776).
21 Supra note 17,
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include inability or sickness of the executive. There was no pro-
vision for disability in the South Carolina Constitution until 1865.
That document developed the "office" of governor on the lieutenant
governor, thus recognizing and multiplying the error in constitu-
tional interpretation made twenty-four years earlier by President
Tyler.22 It is interesting to note that the South Carolina Constitu-
tion of 1868 reverted to the colonial practice by providing for the
lieutenant governor only to "exercise the powers of the governor ' 2"3
and this provision has remained in effect to the present time. In
April 1961, the constitutions of eleven of the original thirteen states
adhered to colonial practice. 24 Only Rhode Island and Virginia
follow the "Tyler trend.
25
Who determined disability in the colonies? The governor
"deputized" the lieutenant governor; otherwise the latter auto-
matically made the determination.26 This custom of automatic
transfer of power was merely a democratic adaptation of the very
early charters which provided for succession from the proprietors
by deputization, regency and descent.
The spirit and the letter of the law of the pre-federal period
substantiates the interpretation placed on the disability clause of
the federal constitution. Research of the Convention proceedings
has been excellent, beginning with Mr. Davis' article at the time
of President Garfield's illness27 and continuing through Mr.
Brownell's evaluation in 1958.21 By the force of fact and logic
Davis, Williams, Silva and Brownell have refuted the arguments
advanced by lesser scholars, including Tyler. The United States
Constitution, Article II, Section 1, clause 6, reads: 29
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties
22 S.C. CONST. art. II, § 9 (1865) (6 THORPE 3274).
23 S.C. CONST. art. III, §§ 7, 9 (1868) (6 THORPE 3290).
24 CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 17; DEL. CONST. art. III, § 20; GA. CONST.
art. V, § 2-3007; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 2, art. III; MD. CONST.
art. II, § 6; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 49; N.J. CONST. art. V, para. 7;
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. III, § 12; PA. CONST. art.
IV, § 13; S.C. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
2 5 R.I. CONST. art. VII, § 9; VA. CONST. art. V, § 78.
20 See WILLIAMS, supra note 10; see also wording of charters and consti-
tutions in note 18.
27 Supra note 2. Comparing the format of Mr. Brownell's article at page
191 with that of Mr. Davis' at page 11 it seems a fair inference that
Mr. Brownell relied heavily on the earlier article.
28 Supra note 2.
29 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President,
and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,
death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and
such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed,
or a President shall be elected.
The words "the same" have been the source of legal arguments
since President Harrison's death on April 4, 1841. Historical con-
troversy developed over the antecedent of "the same": Is the
antecedent "powers and duties" or "the said office"? The experts
have long since pointed out that this phraseology was the result
of an attempt by the Committee on Style30 in:31
... bringing together and combining into one, without alteration of
sense or intent, two cognate provisions found lying apart, by
each of which provisions exercise of the presidential duties by
a substitute was restricted to the period of actual inability. The
committee had no authority to alter or amend; no objection was
taken to their union of these provisions, which fact indicates that
the revised form was not regarded as in any particular altering
or amending "the articles agreed to by the House."
The Davis-Silva-Williams-Brownell school of thought has ad-
vanced several arguments which have not been refuted:
(1) The paucity of records made it extremely difficult for
Tyler to determine legislative intent.3 2 Although no one seems to
have checked before, Tyler could not have consulted any of the
signers of the Constitution, for they were all dead by 1841.33 John
Quincy Adams was still alive, however, and the former president
disagreed completely with Tyler's interpretation.3 4 In addition,
30 Johnston, Hamilton, G. Morris, Madison and King.
"1 DAVIS, supra note 2, at 11.
32 "[A] great deal more is now known about what went on at the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 than was known in the past, even in the
years immediately after the Convention. It was conducted in secrecy,
and not until Madison's notes were published posthumously in 1840 was
a fair picture available, although still not a complete one. Farrand's
work, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 the definitive source
on the subject, did not appear until 1911. Other important data has
come to light subsequently through the research of biographers and
historians dealing with persons and actions of the time. Understandably,
it has taken years for scholars to bring the information together."
BROWNELL, supra note 2, at 192-93.
.3 The Dictionary of American Biography and other reference works do
not offer any information concerning Jacob Broom. However all other
signers died before Harrison. The last known survivor was former
President Madison, who died in 1836.
34 "On April 16, 1841, Adams recorded in his journal that he had called on
Mr. Tyler, 'who styles himself President of the United States, and not
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the statement of Tyler's succession indicates that he himself was
not altogether clear as to his actual status.
35
(2) Other sections of the Constitution conflict with the in-
terpretation given by Tyler.3 6
(3) If Tyler's view is correct, and a Vice President succeeds
to the office of President, why is it that when election time ar-
rives, every such "President" claims that he is running for his
first term?31
Considering the precedents of the colonial era and the research
of the above-named scholars, these conclusions are beyond con-
tention: 38
(1) One who acts as President because of the inability of a
President or Vice President does so only until the disability of
the President or Vice President is removed. (2) The term "in-
ability" covers any de facto inability, whatever the cause or dura-
tion, which occurs when there is urgent public business requiring
Vice-President acting as President, which would be the correct style.'"
Then Adams continued by saying that the whole affair violated the
Constitution, which confers on a Vice President, not the Presidential
Office, but the powers and duties of that office. SILVA, supra note 2,
at 21, citing 10 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 463-64 (Adams
ed. 1874-77).
35 "District of Columbia,
City and County of Washington, ss.
I, William Cranch, chief judge of the circuit court of the District of
Columbia, certify that the above-named John Tyler personally appeared
before me this day, and although he deems himself qualified to perform
the duties and exercise the powers and office of President on the death of
William Henry Harrison, late President of the United States, without
any other oath than that which he has taken as Vice-President, yet as
doubts may arise, and for greater caution, took and subscribed the fore-
going oath before me.
W. CRANCH
April 6, 1841."
4 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 32
(1897). The implications of Tyler's assertion that he could take Harri-
son's place by virtue of the Vice Presidential oath are discussed in
SILVA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 37.
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XII; In art. II,
§ 1, cl. 1, the Constitution provides for the President to hold office for
four years. Our seven "Presidents" have thus been cheated considerably
for none of those succeeding held office for that period. Tyler came
the closest when Harrison died a month after taking office.
37 President Truman states in his Memoirs: "Therefore, to re-establish
that custom [two terms], although by a quibble I could say I've only
had one term, I am not a candidate and will not accept the nomination
for another term." 2 TRUMAN, MEMOIRS 489 (1956).
38 SILVA, supra note 2, at 173.
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the President's personal attention. (3) The one on whom presi-
dential power devolves is to be judge of when an inability exists.
It is a fateful coincidence that most of our states have modeled
their executive disability clauses after the federal constitution..99
Tyler's misinterpretation and its ratification by his successors has
resulted in.confusion in determining gubernatorial disability. What
began as a recognized custom in the colonies was adopted as wise
by the federal Convention. A period of fifty-four years passed
before the disability clause became operative. By then most people
had forgotten the original custom upon which it was based. Guided
only by awkward phraseology, Tyler made an erroneous interpreta-
tion. Dangerous lapses in executive power have resulted.
III. EXPERIENCE IN THE STATES SINCE 1789
Disability clauses in state constitutions, like the federal pro-
vision, are part of a general section dealing with succession. Dis-
ability is grouped with other contingencies, like impeachment or
death. The Nebraska Constitution furnishes an example: 40
In case of the death, impeachment and notice thereof to the
accused, failure to qualify, resignation, absence from the state, or
other disability of the governor, the powers, duties and emolu-
ments of the office for the residue of the term, or until the dis-
ability shall be removed, shall devolve upon the lieutenant
governor.
History shows the difficulty this grouping has created in presi-
dential succession. Because of the tradition that the Vice President
becomes President on the death of the latter, the Garfield and
Wilson cabinets, and the Vice Presidents involved,41 hesitated to
take action, for fear that Garfield or Wilson would be precluded
from resuming the functions of the office on their recovery.
Since the state constitutions have been patterned after the
9 Forty-four state constitutions contain "inability" or "disability" clauses.
See note 40, infra.
40 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 16. Today forty-four state constitutions contain
"inability" or "disability" clauses. Of the six remaining, Maine, (ME.
CONST. art. V, § 14, which is also Amendment LXXXIV) New Hamp-
shire, (N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 49) and Massachusetts (MASS. CONST.
art. II, § 2) provide for succession in case of certain events "or other-
wise." Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. V, § 6) provides for succession
in case of a vacancy "from any cause whatever"; Maryland, (MD.
CONST. art. II, § 6) "or other disqualifications"; and only Tennessee
has no provision regarding succession in event of "disability," "inability,"
"or otherwise."
41 Chester A. Arthur and Thomas Marshall.
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federal constitution, the same dilemma has presented itself on
the state level. In order to understand the interpretation given to
the disability clause of the succession section, it is necessary to
examine the cases dealing with the other contingencies mentioned.
42
A. DEATH
The cases concerned with succession consider the question of
whether or not there is a "vacancy" in the governorship. The
resolution of whether or not the lieutenant governor actually be-
comes governor, or acting governor, is often based upon the answer
to this question. When the governor dies, the above questions
arise most frequently with regard to the salary to be paid to the
alternate. The decisions reflect the confusion which is the common
denominator of nearly all succession situations.
The first two cases arising from the death of a governor
occurred in Nevada. Governor Jones died April 10, 1896, whereupon
Lieutenant Governor Reinhold Sadler succeeded him. The consti-
tution provided that the "powers and duties" devolved upon the
lieutenant governor. The court held that Sadler was acting governor
and entitled to the salary of the governor for the remainder of the
term.43 It is interesting to note that the decision was largely based
on Chadwick v. Earhart,4 4 the leading case for the proposition
that when a governor resigns the lieutenant governor actually
becomes governor. Chief Justice Bigelow apparently had some
reservations about the court's reasoning, and in a concurring opinion
attempted to "clarify" the situation by stating that Lieutenant
Governor Sadler really was "permanent Acting Governor. ' '4 ,
The following year the court had to decide whether Sadler's
position as acting governor created a vacancy in the office of
lieutenant governor. 46 The court held that, "That officer remains
lieutenant governor, but invested with the powers and duties of
the governor."
Five years later the Supreme Court of Washington considered
the identical question. The opinion in State ex rel. Murphy v.
42 For general text discussion and collection of cases see: 14 AM. & ENG.
ENCY. LAW 1108 (2d ed. 1900); 12 R.C.L. Governor § 12 (1929); 24
AM. JUR. Governor §§ 8-10 (1939); 81 C.J.S. States § 74 (1953).
43 State ex rel. Sadler v. La Grave, 23 Nev. 216, 45 Pac. 243 (1896).
44 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180 (1884).
4- 23 Nev. 216, 223, 45 Pac. 243, 245 (1896).
46 State ex rel. Hardin v. Sadler, 23 Nev. 356, 47 Pac. 450 (1897).
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McBride47 evidences the reverence with which some state courts
have viewed the "Tyler Tradition": 48
This provision of the constitution of this state is in effect the
same as the provision of the constitution of the United States
with reference to the succession of the vice president to the
office of President of the United States. Upon the death or dis-
ability of the president, it has uniformly been held that the
vice president holds the office of president until a successor
to a deceased president comes to assume the office....
The Washington court cited the Chadwick case, but then held:
49
When the lieutenant governor, by virtue of his office, and of
the command of the constitution, assumed the duties of governor
on the death of Governor Rogers, the office of lieutenant governor
did not thereby become vacant, but the officer remained lieutenant
governor, intrusted with the powers and duties of governor.
The court was concerned about the implications of the act of
the lieutenant governor in signing bills he had already approved
as lieutenant governor. The opinion concluded: 50
These duties are, no doubt, inconsistent; but this argument,
we think is fully met by another provision of the constitution,
which provides . . . that when the lieutenant governor shall act
as governor the senate shall choose a temporary president. The
lieutenant governor, therefore, when the duties of governor de-
volve upon him, is relieved of the duties of presiding officer of
the senate.
Nebraska's Constitution provides: 51
The Legislature shall . . . chose its own officers, including
a Speaker to preside when the Lieutenant Governor shall be absent,
incapacitated, or shall act as Governor.
Construed in conjunction with Article II, Section 1, providing for
separation of powers, and the McBride case, a strong argument
can be made opposing the participation in any legislative activity
of a lieutenant governor acting as governor.
The Arizona court decided in 1948 that the secretary of state
was merely acting governor on the death of Governor Sidney P.
Osborn. Speaking for the court, Justice La Prade said: 5
2
We do not consider the decision in Chadwick v. Earhart,
supra, as persuasive or authoritative. The interpretation of that
47 29 Wash. 335, 70 Pac. 25 (1902).
4 8 Merriam v. Clinch, 17 Fed. Cas. 68 (No. 9460) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1867).
4929 Wash. 335, 339, 70 Pac. 25, 26 (1902) (Emphasis added).
50 Id. at 340, 70 Pac. at 26.
51 NEB. CONST. art. III, § 10. (Emphasis added).
52 State ex rel. Concini v. Garvey, 67 Ariz. 304, 195 P.2d 153 (1948).
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case was based on the language of the constitutional provision,
and we sincerely believe it was not justified.
The latest case arose in 1953. The Supreme Court of Florida
advised the president of the senate, acting as governor, that he
could sign warrants as "Acting Governor," although he had signed
them previously in his capacity as a legislator, the death of the
governor having intervened.53
Contrary results have been reached in Oregon 54 and Wyoming.5
The Wyoming case represents a unique situation indeed. The sec-
retary of state, acting as governor, claimed both salaries and the
court permitted it.56 Apparently the practice has been accepted,
since it was followed as late as 1960 when Governor J. J. Hickey
became United States Senator to fill a vacancy and the secretary
of state collected salaries for the two positions.
B. IMPEACHMENT
The impeachment cases represent one area of gubernatorial
succession where the rulings of the state courts have been uni-
form. The first reported case occurred in Nebraska in 1873.: 7
Governor Butler had been impeached and the legislature addressed
the Supreme Court regarding Butler's status pending completion of
the trial. Justices Lake and Crounse held that the functions of the
governor are entirely suspended until his acquittal, when they again
become operative, or until his conviction, when the suspension be-
53 Advisory Opinion to Acting Governor Johns, 67 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1953).
54 Olcott v. Hoff, 92 Ore. 462, 181 Pac. 466 (1919). Governor James Withy-
combe died March 3, 1919. Olcott was secretary of state. Hoff, the state
treasurer, refused to pay the governor's salary to Olcott, claiming that
Olcott should be designated "Secretary of State, Acting as Governor."
The court followed Chadwick v. Earhart, 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180 (1884),
holding that Olcott was governor and distinguished the other cases on
the basis of 'the different wording of constitutions involved.
A year later the same court went to the limit to avoid a lapse of
executive power. In State ex rel. Roberts v. Olcott, 94 Ore. 683, 187
Pac. 286 (1920) the court held that although Olcott's term as secretary
of state expired the first Monday in January 1920, he would hold office
as governor until the end of Governor Withycombe's term in January
1923.
55 State ex rel. Chatterton v. Grant, 12 Wyo. 1, 73 Pac. 470 (1903).
46,"On the death of the governor during his term in office a vacancy in
such office existed, to be filled by the Secretary of State, who during
his incumbency was entitled to receive the salaries of both offices." Id.
at 2, 73 Pac. at 471.
f',7 Opinion of the Judges, 3 Neb. 463 (1873).
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comes permanent. 5s Similar holdings appear in New York, 9 North
Dakota, 60 and Oklahoma.61 The uniform rulings in these cases create
some uncertainty as to President Andrew Johnson's status pend-
ing his impeachment trial.
C. FAILURE TO QUALIFY
This phrase in the succession clause covers numerous situations
concerning the governor-elect. The constitutions of the states do
not provide for disability of a nominee, or for filling a vacancy
in such a case. When there is any law at all relating to nominees
it is statutory, and leaves the matter to the discretion of the party
central committees. 62
Fifteen state constitutions specifically deal with death or dis-
ability of a governor-elect. They uniformly provide that the lieuten-
ant governor-elect assumes the gubernatorial office." When there
is no constitutional provision, the courts often decide in favor of
the incumbent, rather than the lieutenant governor-elect. The
cases are split fairly evenly on the question. Five leave the in-
cumbent in office and four install the lieutenant governor-elect
Ss Chief Justice Mason did not feel that the matter, as presented, consti-
tuted a judicial question.
59 People ex rel. Robin v. Hayes, 163 App. Div. 725, 149 N.Y.S. 250 (1914).
'1) State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 256 N.W. 377 (1934).
01 Fitzpatrick v. McAlister, 121 Okla. 83, 248 Pac. 569 (1926). This decision
was reached only after the court carefully distinguished the case from
two earlier cases dealing with the absence of the governor from the state.
62 A survey of governors and national committeemen, undertaken as part
of the research for this article, asked: (1) Is there any provision in your
laws for determining disability of nominees? (2) Is there any procedure
for filling a vacancy if the nominee dies or is disabled? In response to
the first question, of those replying, eighteen men indicated there was
no procedure for determining disability, in three states the party central
committee made the determination according to its party rules, and
three men were uncertain about the procedure. The replies to the
second query revealed that, of those replying, in nineteen states the
state central committee or a convention filled the vacancy. In three of
the states which replied there is no procedure of any kind and both
the governor and the Republican National Committeeman in Florida
were uncertain of the procedure to be followed in such cases.
S 3 ALA. CONST. art. V, § 128; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 10; CALIF.
CONST. art. V, § 16; CONN. CONST. art. IV, § 20; DEL. CONST. art.
III, § 20; IOWA CONST. art. IV, § 4; MASS. CONST. amend. LXXX;
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 16; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 11; N.J. CONST.
art. V, § 1; R.I. CONST. amend. XI, § 3; TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 32;
WASH. CONST. art. III, § 10 and amend. VI.
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as governor. In Ex parte Lawhorn,4 the incumbent was required
to serve until his successor qualified. Carr v. Wilson ' followed
the Lawhorn case, in spite of a clause in the constitution limiting
the governor to one term.
The Nebraska Court considered the question in 1890.66 James
E. Boyd was elected governor in November 1888. After he had
assumed office, his predecessor, James M. Thayer, brought an
action of quo warranto, disputing the validity of Boyd's election
by asserting that Boyd was not a citizen of the United States. Our
Court found for Thayer and said that he, as predecessor, and not
the lieutenant governor-elect, was entitled to the office of governor.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision, deter-
mining that Boyd was not an alien 6 7 but the precedent as to suc-
cession is still cited. 6 While Connecticut reached a conclusion
similar to that of the Nebraska Court in 1892,19 the North Dakota
Supreme Court in 1935 found that failure to meet residence require-
ments constituted a disability and declared the duly elected lieu-
tenant governor Walter Welford, governor.T1
A 1947 opinion by the Ohio attorney general7 1 said the term
"governor" as it appears in the Ohio Constitution 72 does not in-
clude the governor-elect, so that when that person dies, the office
cannot be assumed by the lieutenant governor-elect. Nevertheless
there are contrary court decisions in Kentucky 7 3 Wisconsin,7 4 and
Georgia. 7 This area of succession law needs clarification.
D. RESIGNATION
Many American politicians have resigned from high public
office. Vice President John C. Calhoun did so because of a dif-
6418 Grat. 85 (Va. 1868).
6532 W. Va. 419, 9 S.E. 31 (1889).
66 State ex rel. Thayer v. Boyd, 31 Neb. 682, 48 N.W. 739 (1890).
67 Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U.S. 135 (1892).
68 81 C.J.S. States § 74, n. 64 (1953).
69 State v. Bulkeley, 61 Conn. 287, 23 Atl. 186 (1892).
70 State ex rel. Sathre v. Moodie, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558 (1935).
71 OPS. ATT'Y GEN. (Nos. 1562, 1947).
72 OHIO CONST. art. III, § 15.
73 Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S.W. 177 (1900).
74 State v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 7 N.W.2d 375 (1942).
75 Thompson v. Talmadge, 41 S.E. 883 (Ga. 1947).
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ference in political philosophy with President Andrew Jackson.7 6
The majority of courts interpreting this segment of the succession
clause have reached the same conclusion as in impeachment cases,
that is, that resignation vacates the governorship, but that the
alternate is only acting governor, and that the vacancy continues
until a successor is elected. The confusing aspect is that some
courts have held that while the vacancy in the governorship con-
tinues, the lieutenant governor becomes "acting governor," but
not as one of the contingent duties of lieutenant governor. This
anomaly has resulted from the influence of the early case of
People v. Hopkins.77
In the Hopkins case controversy developed when Church,
deputy insurance superintendent, and acting superintendent,
claimed the salary of the superintendent, who had resigned. The
statute involved provided for appointment of one of the depart-
mental clerks as deputy, but specified that the deputy should
possess the powers and perform the duties of the superintendent
during the latter's absence or inability. The analogy to guber-
natorial succession is apparent, so it was logical for Justice Grover
to refer to the experience of the governors of New York: 78
On the eleventh of February, 1828, the office of governor
became vacant by the death of DeWitt Clinton, the then incumbent
of the office, and its power and duties . . .devolved upon Nathaniel
Pritcher, then lieutenant governor. The question arose as to
whether he was to be regarded . . .as acting governor, or in the
case of the contingent duties of the lieutenant governor, and, as a
consequence, whether he was entitled to the salary of the former
office .... It was held by William M. Marcy, then comptroller,
that he was to be regarded as the acting governor, and entitled to
the salary given by law to that officer. The same question and the
same provision, again arose in 1829 upon the resignation of the
office of Martin Van Buren, and the powers and duties devolving
upon Enos T. Throop, then lieutenant governor, and were decided
the same way by Silas Wright, then comptroller. We surely shall
not go far astray in following the precedents established by these
able jurists, wise statesmen, and rigid economists.
The court determined that the deputy was entitled to the super-
intendent's salary, but that his powers were limited to necessary
actions. Note should be taken of the fact that nowhere in this
paragraph does the court speak of either Pritcher or Throop as
76 Calhoun had been Vice President under Jackson's predecessor, John
Quincy Adams (1824-28). After his resignation in 1832 he served in
the Senate until 1843. In 1844 he was appointed Secretary of State by
John Tyler, but resigned to run for the Senate the following year.
7755 N.Y. 74 (1873).
78Id. at 78.
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governor. They are carefully designated acting governors, but at
the same time not regarded as exercising the contingent duties of
lieutenant governor. This distinction has been ignored in later
cases.
Subsequent cases developed from a variety of situations, but
the courts have adhered to the majority rule. A notable exception
is In re Moore.79 This case was decided ten years before State ex
rel. Chatterton v. Grant,0 and developed from a dispute over the
duration of the alternate's1 term when he succeeded Governor
Francis Warren. The court held that the alternate was governor
until January, 1893, although Warren's term did not expire until
1894. By stating that the alternate was governor the court by
dictum gave the decision in Chatterton a basis in precedent.
Governor Griggs of New Jersey resigned January 31, 1898.
Foster M. Vorhees, president of the senate, qualified as his suc-
cessor, but the court held that when Vorhees resigned as president
of the senate, he also relinquished the right to serve as governor,
the office of governor having been vacant since Griggs' resignation.8 2
Here we find the majority rule, although the unique facts of the
case tend to obscure it.
Colorado lost its "Acting Lieutenant Governor" by a similar
operation of law according to the rule in People ex rel. Parks v.
Cornforth.3 The governor there resigned and the lieutenant gov-
ernor "acted as such." The case is novel because the president
pro tern of the senate, third in the line of succession, claimed that
he then moved into second place and became "Acting Lieutenant
Governor." Apparently his claim was not disputed until the legis-
lature elected another president pro tern of the senate who as-
serted his right to the title. Justice Gunter, speaking for the court,
said that the position was not held de jure, so that when the new
president pro tern was elected he automatically became "Acting
Lieutenant Governor."
Futrell v. Oldham8 4 is often cited in support of the majority
view. Governor Joe T. Robinson resigned March 8, 1913, and the
79 4 Wyo. 98, 31 Pac. 980 (1892).
80 12 Wyo. 1, 73 Pac. 470 (1903). The governor died in the Chatterton
case and the court held that the secretary of state could receive the
salary of both the governor and secretary of state.
81 Secretary of State Amos Barber.
82 State v. Heller, 63 N.J. 105, 42 Atl. 155 (1899).
83 34 Colo. 107, 81 Pac. 871 (1905).
84 107 Ark. 386, 155 S.W. 502 (1913).
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defendant, who was president of the senate, succeeded to his
duties. The legislative session ended March 13th. Futrell was
elected president of the senate before adjournment and the court
had to decide if he succeeded to the governorship itself, or only
its duties. It was held that the vacancy in the governorship con-
tinued, with the duties exercised by Futrell, who still held office
as president of the senate. The court analyzed Chadwick v.
Earhart,5 considered the leading case for the minority view:86
The language of the constitution [of Oregon] is different from
ours, and the opinion was based upon the language, which the
court construed to amount to the devolution of the office itself upon
another.
The court then referred to the fact that the Oregon Constitution
was based on the federal constitution, and said that the decision
was therefore "correct, but not applicable. '1 7
Paul Narcisse Cyr, a foe of Governor Huey Long, was lieu-
tenant governor at the time of Long's election to the United States
Senate in 1930. Cyr took the governor's oath before a notary public
on the theory that Long's election to the Senate vacated the gov-
ernor's office. Long called out the national guard to prevent Cyr
from taking office. Long maintained that since Cyr took the oath
as governor, he was no longer lieutenant governor and A. 0. King,
president pro tern of the state senate was sworn in as lieutenant
governor. Subsequently the Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled
in favor of King on the theory that Cyr had pressed an uncon-
stitutional claim to the office of governor.18
The Cornforth and Futrell cases, in addition to illustrating the
majority view, represent a preoccupation with mechanics of the
law. They do emphasize the necessity for eliminating gaps in the
line of succession."9 The decisions could be questioned as a violation
85 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180 (1884).
86 Futrell v. Oldham, 107 Ark. 386, 155 S.W. 502 (1913).
87 Id. at 389, 155 S.W. at 507.
88 State ex rel. Cyr v. Long, 174 La. 169, 140 So. 13 (1932). The reasoning
of the opinion is summarized in the concurring opinion of Justice St.
Paul: "This court has no more authority to inquire into the title of Huey
P. Long . . .than would a court of the United States be authorized to
inquire into the title of Herbert Hoover, to the office of President of the
United States."
89 See also: State v. Ekern, 228 Wis. 645, 280 N.W. 393 (1938) and Weeks
v. Gamble, 13 Fla. 9 (1870). These cases are examples of attempts to
fill vacancies in the lieutenant governorship, when none existed in the
office of governor. In the Wisconsin case the lieutenant governor re-
signed. The constitution provided for filling the office of lieutenant
governor only if there was a vacancy in both the office of governor and
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of the separation of powers doctrine inasmuch as the "acting" execu-
tive continued also in a legislative capacity. The Supreme Court
of Montana recognized this possibility in State ex rel. Lamey v.
Mitchell."' The court equivocated on the question of whether a
vacancy in the governorship existed,"1 but held that the act of the
lieutenant governor in exercising the powers of the governor re-
lieved him of his duties as presiding officer of the senate."
2
The Chadwick case remains the leading case for the minority
view that the alternate actually becomes governor on the resignation
of that officer; and, as already indicated, the case has had direct
influence upon the interpretation of other phrases in the suc-
cession clause.93 Because it is so often quoted and misquoted, the
case deserves close scrutiny. After the governor's resignation,
the secretary of state discharged the duties of the office. His
term as secretary of state expired before the end of the gov-
ernor's term and the question of the length of his tenure and right
to compensation was raised. The court held that he was entitled
to the salary of governor until the next governor qualified, because
he became governor by right of succession.
lieutenant governor. In this respect the Wisconsin Constitution is like
the United States Constitution. But the court allowed the governor,
under a general statutory proviso for filling vacancies, to appoint a
lieutenant governor. In the Weeks case, the lieutenant governor had been
impeached and convicted. The Florida court upheld the validity of an
appointment by the governor. The provision allowing the president of
the senate to act as lieutenant governor during the latter's "inability"
was not considered applicable to a case of permanent removal. State
ex rel. Marr v. Stearns, 72 Minn. 200, 75 N.W. 210 (1898), could be
interpreted as an extension of the majority rule to the lieutenant gover-
nor. Governor Nelson resigned and Lieutenant Governor Clough acted
in his stead. Frank Day, president pro tern of the Senate, proceeded to
act as lieutenant governor. Exercising his right as senator, he cast the
deciding vote for certain legislation, the subject of the case. In Min-
nesota, the lieutenant governor, although presiding officer of the senate,
could not vote, even to break a tie. Nevertheless, the court upheld the
law, declaring that Day did not cease to be senator when he acted as
lieutenant governor.
90 97 Mont. 252, 34 P.2d 369 (1934).
91 "[Tlhere is no vacancy in the office ... in the sense that there is no
one left without power to discharge the duties. . . ." The court then
cited State ex rel. McGowan v. Sedgwick, 46 Mont. 187, 127 Pac. 94
(1912) as stating that upon the resignation of the governor, there is a
vacancy in the office, ". . . but we do not consider it binding, for the
reason that that was not the question under consideration in that case."
State ex rel. Lamey v. Mitchell, 97 Mont. 252, 34 P.2d 369 (1934).
92 97 Mont. 252, 258, 34 P.2d 369, 372 (1934).
93 See note 85, supra.
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Chief Justice Waldo explains the Chadwick doctrine as fol-
lOWS: 94
In the first place, it is not shown how an office can be vacant,
and yet there be a person, not deputy, or locum tenens of another,
empowered by law to discharge the duties of the office, and who
does in fact, discharge them. It is not explained how, in such a
case, the duties can be separated from the office so that he who
discharges them does not become an incumbent of the office.
And, in the second place, how a person can fill the office of
governor, without being governor. It is the function of a public
officer to discharge public duties. Such duties constitute his
office. Hence, given a public office, and one who, duly em-
powered, discharges its duties, and we have an incumbent in
that office.***
Nor does the language of the section, grammatically con-
sidered, bear the interpretation counsel have put upon it. Leaving
out the co-ordinate clauses following the first clause, the sentence
reads: "In case of the removal of the governor, from office, the
same shall devolve upon the secretary of state." That is, the office
shall devolve. So, taken with each of the succeeding clauses,
the word "same" stands for "office."
The constitution of the United States . . . is nearly the same
with the provision of our state constitution .... The only difference-
conceivably material is that the constitution of the United States
has the words "power and duties" where the constitution of
Oregon has only the word "duties." But it is conceived that duties
necessarily imply powers, and that in legal effect the language
of the two constitutions is the same.
The Chief Justice then cited dictum in the federal case of
Merriam v. Clinch95 to show that the same reasoning had pre-
vailed in interpreting the federal disability clause: 96
The provision, in this section of the constitution, that the
powers and duties of the office of president shall devolve on
the vice president is identical, in legal effect, with the provision
94 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180 (1884). (Emphasis added). The actual wording
of the Oregon Constitution (art. 5, § 8) is as follows: "In case of the
removal of the governor from office, or of his death, resignation, or
inability to discharge the duties of the office, the same shall devolve
on the secretary of state. . . ." Thus, the wording of the federal con-
stitution, conveying an intent never intended by its framers, multiplied
the error when it was perpetuated in the Oregon Constitution.
This is the reasoning of Speaker of the House of Representatives, Sam
Rayburn, in regard to presidential disability: "If the president is sick
the vice president does not take over the powers of the presidency
because the only person who can do that is the President himself. A
man must be President to take over these powers." Letter from Hon.
Sam Rayburn to Richard A. Peterson, October 12, 1960.
95 17 Fed. Cas. 68 (No. 9460) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1867).
96 Id. at 70.
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of the 22d section of the act of 1799, that the authorities and duties
vested in the collector of customs of the Port of New York shall
devolve on his deputy. Three times, since the adoption of the
constitution, the president has died, and under the provision
referred to, the powers and duties of president have devolved
on the vice president. All branches of the government have, under
such circumstances, recognized the vice president as holding the
office of president, as authorized to assume its title, and as en-
titled to its emoluments. The vice president holds the office of
president until a successor to the deceased president comes to
assume the office, at the expiration of the term for which the
deceased president and the vice president were elected. . . . It
has never been supposed that, under the provision of the con-
stitution, the vice president, in acting as president, acted as the
servant, or agent, or locum tenens of the deceased president, or in
any other capacity than as holding the office of president fully,
for the time being, by virtue of express authority emanating
from the United States.
Justice Waldo then cites People v. Hopkins,97 overlooking the fact
that the governors mentioned in those cases were considered
"acting governor," while Tyler repudiated the title.
The Chadwick case stands by itself in the cases interpreting
the "resignation" phrase of the succession clause. But it has in-
fluenced the decision of other succession situations, and symbolizes
also the effect of the Tyler tradition on state law.
E. ABSENCE FROM THE STATE
When the governor leaves the state the operation of the suc-
cession clause assumes a different aspect than in the preceding
cases. "Absence" differs materially from death, impeachment, or
resignation, for the governor can return from a trip, while the other
contingencies have a finality denied by no one.
People ex rel. Tennant v. Parker,"" presents a factual situation
which exemplifies the unquestioned acceptance of colonial prec-
edent. After the impeachment conviction of Governor Butler in
1872, W. H. James, Secretary of State, exercised the powers of the
governor." During this same period Isaac S. Hascall, a state senator,
was elected president of the senate. James left Nebraska in Febru-
ary, 1872, to attend to state business in Washington. Learning of
James' absence, Hascall, who lived in Omaha, hurried to Lincoln.
97 55 N.Y. 74 (1873).
983 Neb. 409 (1872).
,9 The Nebraska Constitution of 1866-67 did not provide for a lieutenant
governor.
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At the capitol he obtained the Great Seal from James' secretary
on the pretense of certifying that some person was a notary public.
Actually, he put its impress on a proclamation convening the leg-
islature. When James heard of Hascall's action he returned post
haste to Lincoln and issued a second proclamation, rescinding the
first. Hascall's friends, a minority of the legislature, disregarded
the second proclamation, came to Lincoln on the appointed day,
and after using violence to overcome James' resistance at the doors
of the legislature, proceeded to organize for the session. Parker,
the defendant, was appointed sergeant at arms, and immediately
arrested Senator Tennant, the plaintiff, who had chosen to honor
the second proclamation. The court, in ultimately deciding that
Tennant should be released on habeas corpus proceedings, had to
determine if the legislature was in session, which required a con-
clusion regarding the extent of the powers of an alternate during
the absence of the acting governor. Justices Crounse and Lake
held that the second proclamation was valid, but for different rea-
sons. Chief Justice Oliver Mason dissented on the basis that the
legislature is the sole determinant of when it is in session. Justice
Lake's opinion is worthy of note, because it distinguished between
temporary and permanent disability; it also illustrates the con-
stancy of our state courts in avoiding any lapse of executive
power: 100
[W]hen the question was first presented to me I was strongly
inclined to the opinion . . . that so soon as the governor sets his
foot beyond the limits of our state, the officer next in succession
therein, may at once assume all the authority, and exercise all
or any of the duties pertaining to the executive department of
government. But when I reflect upon the possible consequences
of such a construction of the constitution, upon the disgraceful
tricks, strifes and exhibitions, which might be entailed upon the
people of the state, of which our present situation presents a sad
and humiliating commentary, I am induced to hesitate and cast
about me for a more salutary rule . . . if, for any good and suf-
ficient reason, the executive shall become satisfied that the ne-
cessity which induced the call has passed, or that it was unad-
visedly made, it is not only his right, but his duty, to revoke the
same, that the people may be saved the expense which otherwise
would be laid upon them.
Nor does it matter whether the revocation be by the same
person who issued the proclamation or not, so long as he is for
the time being in the legitimate exercise of the executive functions
of government.
It is not the act of the individual, strictly speaking, but of the
executive, in which there is, in one sense, no interregnum.
10OPeople ex rel. Tennant v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409, 423 (1872).
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One of the most intriguing aspects of the case is that both Hascall
and James signed the proclamations "Acting Governor." Neither
asserted, at any time during the controversy, that the Tyler tradi-
tion applied. Under analagous conditions, however, the Kentucky
court declared a similar second proclamation invalid, for the same
reason advanced by Chief Justice Mason in the Parker case: the
legislature is the sole judge of when it is in session.10 1
Although the Parker case is the first recorded case on "absence,"
the courts have relied chiefly on State ex rel. Warmoth v.
Graham.1 2 In that case the Governor was absent from the state at
two intervals in 1871. The lieutenant governor claimed the gov-
ernor's salary for these periods. As in Parker, no claim was made
to the office of governor, and all parties spoke in terms of the
lieutenant governor assuming the "powers and duties of the gov-
ernor." The court held that the governor was not "absent" within
the meaning of the constitution, such absence being defined as
"such as would injuriously affect the public interest."'1 3 Chief
Justice Ludeling spoke, however, of the necessity of: 104
. .certain proof, accessible to the public, from which they may
with certainty derive the knowledge as to who is authorized to
act as governor, of the State. As the law makes no provision for
the mode in which the governor shall manifest to the public his
absence from the State, it necessarily is left to his discretion
subject to his responsibility to the people, and if the interests of
the State should suffer in consequence of his prolonged absence,
he would be amenable to public sentiment and to the control of
the impeaching power of the State.
The colonial precedent of the lieutenant governor as a "deputy"
is apparent. Nine years later the Missouri Supreme Court followed
the Graham case in a similar situation.10 5
No further cases were recorded until 1913 when the Oklahoma
Criminal Court formulated the minority rule by interpreting "ab-
sence" literally in two cases involving pardons. Ex parte Crump,"",
decided in October, 1913, upheld a pardon granted by Lieutenant
Governor McAlister when Governor Cruce was out of the State.
In doing so the court stressed the necessity for continuity of execu-
0'0 Royster v. Brock, 258 Ky. 146, 79 S.W.2d 707 (1935).
10226 La. Ann. 568 (1874).
10321 Am. Rep. 551, 552 (1874).
104Ibid.
'
6 5State ex rel. Crittenden v. Walker, 78 Mo. 139 (1883). People ex rel.
Tennant v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (1872), was not cited.
10610 Okla. Crim. 133, 135 Pac. 428 (1913).
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tive power, looking beyond American colonial experience to English
history for precedents: 107
In all regular governments there is no interregnum, and there
should always be someone capable of administering the laws at the
head of the government. The de facto doctrine originated in
England centuries ago and was carried so far with respect to the
English crown that treasons committed under Henry VI (a King
"in deed and not in right"), not in the aid of the lawful claimant,
were punished under Edward IV. Bacon says that "it hath been
settled that all judicial acts done by Henry VI, while he was king,
and also all pardons of felony and characters of designation granted
by him, were valid." . . . On the same principle when the power of
Cromwell was overturned and Charles II restored, the judicial
decisions under the former remained unmolested and the judiciary
went on as before, still looking only to the de facto government
for the time being....
In December, 1913, the court, in effect followed the Crump case
in Ex parte Hawkins.08
The strength of the holdings in these two cases was somewhat
vitiated by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1926 when the
decision in Fitzpatrick v. McAlister' 9 was announced. Governor
J. C. Walton was convicted in impeachment proceedings and the
court had to decide whether Lieutenant Governor Trapp became
governor, and as such, was ineligible to succeed himself. The
Oklahoma Court made the logical distinction: 110
In the Crump case the court was dealing with an occasion
of temporary absence of the Governor from the state . . . under
the conditions here presented, the impeached Governor has no
right to return and oust the present Governor and assume the
powers of the office of Governor .... We are dealing with a con-
dition where the disability cannot be removed; the law provides
no means for its removal; it has become final; and it is our duty
to avoid speculations and deal with the actual condition which
confronts us.
The court then drew a parallel between the Oklahoma and United
States Constitutions: "Said section of the federal constitution is
identical with ours, with the exception that ours is the stronger
and more definite. . . ."I" Most courts have adhered to the broad
interpretation given in the Tennant case and in State v. Graham.
11 2
10710 Okla. Crim. 133, 137, 135 Pac. 428, 433 (1913).
10810 Okla. Crim. 396, 136 Pac. 991 (1913).
109121 Okla. 83, 248 Pac. 569 (1926). Supra note 61.
110121 Okla. 83, 88, 248 Pac. 569, 575 (1926).
"'Id. at 89, 248 Pac. at 576.
112 Markham v. Cornell, 136 Kan. 884, 18 P.2d 158 (1933); Johnson v. John-
son, 141 Neb. 239, 3 N.W.2d 414 (1942). The lieutenant governor sued
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F. DISABILITY
There are only two reported cases on the problem of guber-
natorial disability. 113 On March 31, 1890, Governor David H.
Goodell of New Hampshire sent the following letter to the attorney
general: 114
Please take such steps as you think necessary to cause the
president of the senate to exercise the powers of the office of
governor during the vacancy caused by my illness. I am not able
to perform the duties of the office, and the public service should
not suffer from my inability.
Upon receipt of the letter the attorney general petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the president
of the senate to exercise the executive power and duties. Chief
Justice Charles Doe's opinion in this case, is the classic one in this
field: 115
From 1784 to 1792 the governor (then styled President of the
State of New Hampshire) was president of the senate. Instead of
his present power of vetoing or approving bills passed by the
senate and house, he had "a vote equal with any other member" of
the senate, and also "a casting vote in case of a tie," and when his
office was vacant all his powers were exercised by "the senior
senator." When the constitution took effect, and the legislature
met for the inauguration of the new government, June 2, 1784,
Meshech Weare, the governor-elect was unable to be present.
In brief periods of his illness and absence, in June, 1784, and
February, 1785, his duties were performed by Woodbury Langdon,
senior senator, acting as governor pro tern. On both occasions
Langdon presided in the senate, by virtue of his provisional tenure
of the governor's office; and on the 8th of June, 1784, as governor,
he sat with the council, and exercised the governor's power (with
the required advice and consent of the council) of signing warrants
for the payment of money. . . The authority of this precedent
has not been shaken, and it does not appear that the soundness of
the contemporaneous construction has even been doubted. ...
The mischief designed to be prevented was the suspension
of executive government by the governor's death, absence from
the state, or disability .... The prescribed remedy is the duty of a
substitute to act in cases of necessity. The services of a substitute
may be necessary when the governor's absence or inability is
for the governor's salary during the latter's absence; In re an Act Con-
cerning Alcoholic Beverages, 130 N.J. 123, 31 A.2d 837 (1943), the court
held the governor must notify the lieutenant governor of his return;
In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 112 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1959).
113Barnard v. Taggart, 66 N.H. 362, 29 Atl. 1027 (1890); Wrede v. Richardson,
77 Ohio St. 182, 82 N.E. 1072 (1907).
114 Barnard v. Taggart, 66 N.H. 362, 29 Atl. 1027 (1890).
115Id. at 363, 29 Atl. at 1028.
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temporary as well as when it is permanent. . . . In article 49,
"vacant by reason of his death, absence from the state, or other-
wise," has a broader significance if due weight is given to the evi-
dential force of the primary and leading purpose that the executive
work shall go on without interruption. An intermittent Vacancy,
such as occurred in the time of Governor Weare, may occur again;
and the evils of an interregnum, which article 49 was intended to
prevent, are not to be introduced by technical reasoning or arbi-
trary rules....
The New Hampshire court, without direct reference to Hamilton's
characterization of the Vice President, spoke of the alternate con-
sistently throughout the opinion as a "substitute." The references
to early New Hampshire history evidence the court's understand-
ing and recognition of the precedents of the pre-federal era. For
all of these reasons the decision is sound constitutionally and prac-
tical in effect. Since the governor himself had announced his
disability, the court was not faced with a decision regarding
determination of that condition. But Chief Justice Doe discussed
that problem: I16
There might be a case in which the attorney general would
intervene without such request. While a determination of the
question of vacancy on a petition of this kind is not legally requisite
to call the president of the senate to the executive chair, it may be
a convenient mode of avoiding embarrassment that might some-
times arise from doubt and controversy in regard to his authority,
and the validity of his acts. The existence of an executive vacancy
is a question of law and fact within the judicial jurisdiction. If
the defendant exercised executive power without a previous judg-
ment on that question, the legality of his acts could be contested
and determined in subsequent litigation, and the judicial character
of the question does not depend upon the time when it is brought
into court. With adequate legal process, the consideration and de-
cision of such a question may be prospective as well as retrospective.
The Ohio Supreme Court reached a contrary decision in the
Wrede case. The extreme illness of the governor did not cause the
powers and duties of the office to devolve upon the lieutenant gov-
ernor, said the court, because the governor "had not voluntarily re-
linquished the office.""' 7 Contrary to the interpretation scholars
have put on the federal constitution, the court continued: 118 "A self-
contained Lieutenant Governor could not be expected to assume
the functions of the Governor upon his own initiative."
As late as 1935 the New Hampshire Court indicated its support
16 1d. at 368, 29 Atl. at 1031.
11777 Ohio St. 182, 190, 82 N.E. 1072, 1075.
111Sbid.
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of the Taggart case. In Opinion of the Judges,119 a unanimous
decision by the court made the distinction between temporary and
permanent disability and permitted the president pro tern of the
senate to act as governor when that officer was absent from the
state.
Actual practice has given additional weight to Taggart. Gov-
ernor John S. Little of Arkansas suffered a nervous breakdown
in 1907. Although Little did not resign and was considered gov-
ernor for the balance of the term, the president and president
pro tern of the senate exercised the powers and duties of the office.
Governor Chamberlain of Oregon died in 1910 and was succeeded
by Frank M. Benson, who then became governor under the ruling
in the Chadwick case. But even in Oregon, practicality super-
seded constitutional law and when Benson became incapacitated,
Jay Bowerman, president of the senate, acted as governor the
balance of the term.120
One of the most extended cases of disability occurred in Illinois
in the late 1930's. 121 Following a heart attack in November, 1938,
Governor Henry Horner spent several months in Florida to regain
his health, returning to Illinois in April, 1939. Despite his illness
he would not surrender his office. On April 8, 1939, just prior to
the state primary, Lieutenant Governor Stelle proclaimed himself
acting governor and called for a special session of the legislature
to meet on the same day Governor Horner had convened the
legislature. The official seal was affixed on Governor Horner's
call 122 and Stelle took his position as presiding officer of the senate
when it met. On October 5, 1939, Governor Horner's secretary
signed a "disability certificate" and filed it with the secretary of
state. The next day the governor died.
The legal ramifications attendant to the illness of Governor
Earl K. Long in 1959 illustrate the technicalities encountered in
this area. Under Louisiana law, Long could not be involuntarily
committed while governor. Impeachment was required first. This
was the reason he was taken to Texas. Long was released from the
hospital at Galveston only after he agreed to enter a Louisiana
institution voluntarily. After signing in at a New Orleans hospital
11987 N.H. 489, 177 AtI. 655 (1935).
120STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMM. TO STUDY PRESIDENTIAL INABIL-
ITY, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84th CONG. 2D SESS.,
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY 42 (1956).
121 Note, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 521 (1941).
22Apparently Stelle was not as ingenious as Nebraska's Isaac Hascall in
Tennant v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (1872).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 40, 1961
he left by car. Lieutenant Governor Lether Frazer took over the
gubernatorial duties hesitantly-"until I learn something else."
The Attorney General, Jack Gremillion, declared Frazer was "act-
ing governor" until Long could resume his duties.123
Nebraska's Governor Charles Bryan was incapacitated due to
illness, but he continued to direct the state government, in some
degree, from his bed for a period of two months. 124 During Gov-
ernor Ralph G. Brooks' last illness no one could agree on the pro-
cedure for determining disability. The attorney general's office
issued no official opinion, although that officer commented to the
press that "it was up to the Governor." The Republican lieutenant
governor said that any citizen could call a hearing before the
attorney general. The attorney general denied this. The Gov-
ernor's administrative assistant said the whole problem was a
medical question. 2 5 The 72nd session of the Nebraska legislature
passed a bill in 1961 which clarifies the situation by creating a
board to determine disability. 26
The constitutions of only three states mention the method of
determining disability: A 1 a b a m a, 27 Mississippi, 28 and New
Jersey.129 In Alabama the supreme court makes the determination,
but can act only in cases of "unsoundness of mind." The secretary
of state submits the question to the supreme court in Mississippi,
while in New Jersey the supreme court decides, but the legislature
instigates the action. Texas130 and Alaska 131 constitutions provide
that the procedure shall be prescribed by law, but no laws have
been passed on the subject.
Although Oregon has no constitutional provision to this effect,
the legislature has passed a law creating a disability board composed
1230PS. ATT'Y GEN. 195 (1959). Time, June 29, 1959, p. 13.
124Lincoln Star, Sept. 1, 1960, p. 38, col. 1. Governor Bryan was to begin
a new term in January 1933. Walter Jurgensen (D), the retiring lieu-
tenant governor asserted that he, and not Theordore Metcalfe (R), the
lieutenant governor-elect, would act as governor if Bryan had not re-
covered by inauguration day. While Bryan was not sufficiently re-
covered to take part in the official ceremonies he took the oath privately
and thus blocked Jurgensen's move. See 22 NEB. L. REV. 20 (1943).
125Lincoln Star, Sept. 1, 1960, p. 38, col. 1.
126L.B. 221, 72d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1961). This bill was passed by the
Legislature on May 2, 1961, and signed by the Governor on May 5, 1961.
127ALA. CONST. art. V, § 128.
128MISS. CONST. art. V, § 131.
129N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 8.
130 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a).
131ALASKA CONST. art. III, § 12.
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of the Chief Justice, the Superintendent of the State Hospital at
Salem, and the Dean of the University of Oregon Medical College. 132
Governor Hatfield says: "These statutes were not passed under
any constitutional authority nor, in my opinion; were they pre-
vented by any constitutional provision.' 33 However, it could be
argued that the law is authorized by the Oregon Constitution which
gives the legislature "all powers necessary for a branch of the Legis-
lative Department, of a free and independant [sic] state." Never-
theless, the law is open to question on the basis of the separation of
powers doctrine.
As previously mentioned the Nebraska legislature passed a
similar law." 4 This state has an "all laws necessary" provision in
the constitution, 135 but it also has a section limiting the power of the
legislature to fill vacancies relating to "the death of the incum-
bent... removal from the state, resignation, conviction of a felony,
impeachment, or becoming of unsound mind.""36 The constitution
says nothing about physical disability. It could be argued that this
section applies only to filling and not to determining vacancies,
but this seems an artificial distinction. The constitutionality of this
law, considering the possible violation of the separation of powers
doctrine, is doubtful.
A void in state law is indicated, and legislation would seem emi-
nently desirable to clarify procedure and thus avoid prolonged liti-
gation in time of crisis.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
1. Temporary and permanent disability. The wide range of
thought found in the opinions on succession reflects diversity of
phrasing in the constitutions. More significantly, these cases indi-
cate the struggle of the state judiciary to adapt one clause to a num-
ber of situations inherently different. The decisions are inconsistent
when succession is regarded as a single problem, rather than the re-
sult of any one of a series of circumstances. Conversely, the cases
are a tribute to the tenacity of our state judges in adhering to a prin-
ciple which predated our legal system, dominated our colonial law,
132ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 176.040, 176.050 (1959).
33Letter from Governor Mark 0. Hatfield, Mar. 6, 1961.
134Supra note 126.
"35NEB. CONST. art. XVII, § 6.
136NEB. CONST. art. III, § 23.
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and influenced the composition of the federal constitution: There
must be no lapse in executive power.
The effect of the Tyler tradition is self-evident. Though that
custom may not be good constitutional law, it is a 119 year old tra-
dition, ratified by six presidents, and it cannot be ignored. Nor
should it be. The words of Justice Blatchford in Merriam v. Clinch,1
37
although dictum, have a solid basis in logic. When a president dies,
the vice president cannot be considered the "servant, or agent, or
locum tenens of the deceased president." The essence of the co-
lonial practice was that the alternate was a deputy, but no one ever
suggested that he was a deputy for a dead man.
All of these cases lead to the inescapable conclusion that our
state and national constitutions must be amended to recognize the
basic difference between temporary and permanent disability. In
other words, instead of arguing about the Tyler tradition, it should
be embodied in the constitution: "In cases of permanent disability,
the alternate succeeds to the office of chief executive." This was
the substance of the legislation proposed by President Eisenhower.' 3
It follows that in cases of temporary disability the colonial prece-
dent should be followed and the alternate should be considered as
a "substitute" or "deputy" until the disability shall be removed or
become permanent.
The intriguing legal question suggested in the Chadwick case
has not been answered in any of the succeeding cases. Chief Justice
Waldo commented: "It is not explained how . . .the duties can be
separated from the office so that he who discharges them does not
become an incumbent of the office.' 3 9 It is a different way of stat-
ing the question which perplexed the Garfield, Wilson, and
Eisenhower cabinets: What is the legal status of the disabled ex-
ecutive when the alternate is exercising the powers of the office?
Is he in a "legal limbo" until the disability is removed? It would
be reassuring to have a lucid explanation in the constitution, in ad-
dition to the distinction between temporary and permanent
disability.
The legal rationale could be explained simply, thus dispelling
the question raised by Chadwick: Upon inauguration the executive
is vested with two rights. The first is the right to his term of office,
and such right is subject to termination only by death, resigna-
tion, conviction by impeachment, or permanent disability. The
1717 Fed. Cas. 68 (No. 9460) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1867).
l38s. Res. 161, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
139Chadwick v. Earhart, 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180 (1884).
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second right is that of exercising the powers and duties of the
office. This is a contingent right, subject to temporary suspension
in the national interest, in case of temporary inability, or pending
the determination of impeachment proceedings.
2. Determination of Disability. Merriman Smith, veteran White
House correspondent, describes the ideal plan for determining dis-
ability as one which is "trustworthy, but it must also be swift, small
and uncomplicated.' 4 4 Few of the proposals offered to date on
either the state or federal level meet this standard. Most of the
plans offered have suggested that the determination of disability
be made by the legislative branch, the Supreme Court, or a com-
bination of the two with officials from the executive branch. Mr.
Brownell's evaluation becomes pertinent at this point: 141
Many earnest people have suggested that the prestige and im-
partiality of members of the Supreme Court be enlisted to head or
staff an inability commission, but the letter of Chief Justice
Warren 142 of January, 1958, would seem to have removed - and
wisely so - all possibility of the Justices' participation in such
a group. Various officers of legal and medical societies have also
been suggested for membership. Since they are not publicly elected
officials and have no public responsibility, however, a better plan
would be to ask these worthy persons to serve, if at all, in an
advisory capacity.
If the power of initial determination is diverted from the
executive branch, or even is shared in some fashion with those
outside the executive, a way is opened for harassment of a president
for political motives. A major shift in the checks and balances
among the three divisions of the federal government could well
result.
During the Hayes-Tilden election dispute an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court served on the commission to decide the elec-
tion. The court was criticized for years for taking part in the contro-
versy. At the time of the Nebraska Constitutional Convention of
1919-1920 it was proposed that the Chief Justice of the Nebraska Su-
preme Court sit as a member of the Board of Pardons. Chief Jus-
140Letter from Merriman Smith to Richard H. Hansen, Oct. 21, 1960.
14 1Brownell, Presidential Disability: The Need For a Constitutional Amend-
ment, 68 YALE L. J. 189, 198 (1958).
142The letter from Chief Justice Warren is as follows: "... It has been
the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers in our
Government, the nature of the judicial process, the possibility of a
controversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of
disqualification which might result in the lack of a quorum, it would be
inadvisable for any member of the Court to serve on such a Commis-
sion. . . ." Id. at 199 n.22.
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tice Morrissey quickly discountenanced such a plan as imposing a
non-judicial function on the Court.
Former President Truman believes the matter should be de-
termined by a vote of the Congress. This proposal would hardly
assure swift and decisive action. Nor would the public place confi-
dence in a non-political decision by a Congress which, by its very
nature, is political. After the experience with Congress during
the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson few support this pro-
posal.
Former President Hoover and certain influential members of
the Eisenhower official family favor determination by the cabinet.
Merriman Smith says the cabinet "would be sure to play a house
game for fear of losing their jobs." The fact that Wilson fired Sec-
retary of State Lansing for suggesting a disability existed, lends
credence to the correspondent's opinion.
Experience with chief executives, state and national, reveals
two fundamental misconceptions in the law. These fallacies have
not been fully recognized or formulated to date. They are: (1) the
executive will recognize and admit his disability and voluntarily
relinquish the office; (2) the alternate will be kept informed of the
executive's condition so he can make an intelligent determination.
Time after time experience has proved that these theories do not
hold up in practice. During periods of executive incapacity, doctors,
not the alternate, have determined what business the executive
should transact and when.143 The Eisenhower and Brooks' illnesses
offer the latest proof for this contention: 144
On his arrival in Denver, Adams made it clear to the physicians
that he would defer to their judgment on bringing matters to the
President's attention during the crucial seven days ahead.
When the question of Governor Brooks' capacity to conduct
executive affairs was raised the press was told the matter was
"a medical question."
Yet in all cases to date the constitution involved has placed the
responsibility for determining disability on the alternate, and in
most cases the alternate had no access to the executive.
Perhaps our failure to solve the problem has resulted from an
143During Garfield's illness "the physicians forbade him to discuss public
affairs." SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 54-55, University of
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, (1951), Copyright by the University of
Michigan; Mrs. Wilson submitted papers to Doctor Grayson. "If Gray-
son thought that the President could pass judgment on the matter with-
out excitement, the paper was shown to him." Id. at 59-60.
144Heinlein, The Problem of Presidential Inability, 25 U. CINC. L. REV.
310, 320 (1956); Lincoln Evening Journal, Aug. 30, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
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unwillingness to accept the facts of history. The problem we are
dealing with is really one of the general health of the executive, not
merely a series of isolated illnesses. The state cases reviewed have
spoken of the public interest in a vigorous executive. Why not recog-
nize the public interest in the health of our chief executives and
make the deference to the medical profession prospective as well as
retrospective? So much depends upon the good health of our gover-
nors and the president that preventive medicine for them should be
required by our constitutions. When our chief executives are sick
the public interest should not also suffer. Such a situation could be
avoided prospectively by requiring periodic physicals by an impar-
tial board of physicians (not the executive's personal physician)
with the stipulation that the findings be made public. If the health
of the executive were in danger through overwork or otherwise,
the board could make a recommendation to the "cabinet"' 45 that a
state of temporary disability existed. Public opinion would force
action by the cabinet. This idea is not revolutionary. Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy have made a practice of having
regular physicals, so the requirement would make a situation de
jure which has been de facto, while at the same time removing the
physicians from the immediate control and influence of the execu-
tive.
Immediately the argument is raised: The board will act from
political motives, harass the executive, and deprive him of his
privacy. The ironic fact is that the same people who advance this
view are the same ones who are willing to defer to the judgment
of the physicians when the executive is ill. The public interest is
then secondary; politics is somewhere in between. Furthermore,
election to public office automatically curtails privacy, at least in-
sofar as the public interest is concerned.
Certainly every precaution should be taken to see that the ex-
amining physicians are not subject to political influence-from out-
side or inside the executive department. The Civil Service Commis-
sion lists on its rosters thousands of doctors. The Cabinet or the
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare could find five men
qualified to staff the board. Personnel could be changed yearly as
a precaution against political pressure; and the board could call in
specialists as needed. They would no doubt wish to consult with
the President's personal doctor, but his opinions would be advisory
only.
Similar procedures could be adopted by the states. The compo-
145The term "cabinet" as applied to state government encompasses the ap-
pointive heads of the executive departments.
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sition of the board now existing in the state of Oregon could serve
as a model, although the law would have to be amended so that it
would be prospective as well as retrospective. Oregon and Nebraska
have already recognized the medical nature of the problem by
making two of the three board members doctors. Such a law would
also eliminate the alternate from the determination, thus avoiding
the embarassment and criticism attendant in deciding upon his own
advancement. There would be no conflict of interest and he would
assume office under more favorable circumstances.
3. Associated problems.
(a) Election of governor and lieutenant governor as a team.
Much litigation has developed from the deeds of acting governors
when the chief executive has been absent from the state. Governor
Edwin L. Mechem of New Mexico cites such an incident from his
own experience: 146
One term the lieutenant governor went to the United States
House of Representatives, and left me with a Democrat Secretary
of state. I left the state one time and she pardoned a vicious
criminal in my absence. I never left again.
Nearly every state has had a similar situation develop at some
time or other in its history, but Kentucky has had more than its
share: 147
One example in the past is a situation where the Governor
was out of the state, the Lt. Governor called a special session of
the Legislature. In another administration, it was impossible for
the governor to leave the state even to dedicate a bridge between
Kentucky and another state for fear of actions that would be taken
by the Lt. Governor who was not in accord with his program.
In addition, the Lt. Governor being president of the senate is in
a position to completely cripple or destroy the legislative program
of a governor with whose program he is not in sympathy. ...
There is another excellent reason for electing the governor and
lieutenant governor by this method: 148
If the people select a member of one party as the chief execu-
tive it would seem that they have placed faith in the man and
his political party and if the incumbent dies in office and is re-
placed by an opposite party member it is at least to some extent
disavowing the action of the people.
The usual rebuttal to this argument is that the electorate is
146Letter from Governor Edwin L. Mechem, Mar. 2, 1961.
14 7Letter from Edward L. Fossett, Administrative Assistant to Governor
Bert T. Combs, Jan. 30, 1961.
148Letter from Donald J. Mitchell, Democratic National Committeeman
from Iowa, Feb. 23, 1961. Governor William L. Guy of North Dakota
made a similar statement in a letter Mar. 16, 1961.
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aware of the difference in party affiliation; they are designated by
party on the ballot. "Splitting the ticket," say the advocates of
separate election, is laudable for it represents voting for the "man"
and not the "party." The answer to this premise is another question:
How many people have the problems of succession in mind when
they "split" their ticket? Whether we like it or not, parties adopt
a platform and their members enact it into law, even when the
legislature is supposedly non-partisan.
Only Alaska and New York elect their governor and lieutenant
governor as a team. Joseph Martin, Jr., Republican National Com-
mitteeman from California, says that election by a similar method
may not eliminate personality conflicts, but it will certainly mini-
mize them.14 9
(b) Vacancy in the alternate's office. When a permanent dis-
ability exists and the alternate succeeds to the office of chief ex-
ecutive, provision should be made for filling the vacancy. The same
reasons supporting the election of the chief executive and alternate
as a team apply to this situation. The cases where the president of
the senate has acted as governor prove that the same distressing
circumstances develop. For that reason the decisions have permitted
the governor to appoint a lieutenant governor, thus keeping the
line of succession intact. Federal nominating practice offers an in-
teresting analogy. Since the adoption of the national convention
system for selecting candidates, the presidential nominees, with
the exception of Adlai Stevenson in 1956, have chosen their running
mates. The national convention, as a practical matter, merely rati-
fies a vice presidential nomination already made by the presiden-
tial nominee.
There are similar and serious reasons why a successor Presi-
dent, like Mr. Truman, should be permitted by the constitution to
fill a Vice Presidential vacancy. The Presidential Succession Act
of 1948150 was an improvement over previous legislation. But in the
event of the temporary or permanent disability of both the president
and vice president, the present law could place another party in
control of the executive department. If Eisenhower and Nixon had
been disabled, Democrat Sam Rayburn would have become presi-
149"We have had examples in California where a governor has been dis-
trustful of, or antagonistic to, a lieutenant governor of his own party to
the point where he hesitated to leave the state, and certainly the pos-
sibility of such a situation existing would be far more likely in the
event the two were of opposite parties." Letter, Mar. 28, 1961.
1503 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
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dent. The vast powers of federal patronage would pass from one
party to another in the middle of a term.
A solution to this problem would be to word the Act in the al-
ternative, so that either the Speaker of the House or the House
Minority Leader, whichever is of the same party as the president,
would succeed to the presidency. If this were done throughout the
line of succession, in state and national legislation, an "orderly
transition" would be more than a quadrennial occasion.
(c) Elimination of legislative duties of the alternate. Provi-
sion should be made to relieve an alternate of legislative duties
while he fills a temporary vacancy in the executive office.
(d) Salary. Existing clauses regarding the "emoluments of the
office" should be clarified where necessary, so that an alternate act-
ing as executive receives the executive's salary temporarily, or con-
tinues to receive the alternate's salary. But the constitution should
be clear.
(e) Absence. Case law should be formalized by an amendment
stating that "absence" means only such absence as will "injuriously
affect the interests of the state."
(f) Disability of the executive-elect and of nominees. The con-
stitution should stipulate that upon the death or disability of the
governor-elect, the lieutenant governor-elect assumes the office.
Disability could be determined by the same method applicable to
the incumbent. Similarly, statutes should codify the informal rules
of the parties which now govern in the case of death or disability
of a nominee.
These proposals are dictated by history, common sense, and the
pressure of our time. Continuity of government means more than
passing a succession law to cover nuclear disasters. It must also
mean an orderly transition in case of executive disability. When
constitutional revision is proposed, these matters are worthy of the
most serious consideration.' 5'
"5'For examples of proposals to revise the state constitutions, see COM-
MISSION ON REORGANIZATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT, SUC-
CESSION TO ELECTIVE OFFICES AND DISABILITY OF OFFICERS
1-15 (First report, June 1960); FLA. SEC. OF STATE, REVISED FLOR-
IDA CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE LEGISLATURE § 9.
